The Globalist Notebook

by Sarah Swong:

On the eve of antigovernment protests scheduled for February 4^th in St. Petersburg, political activist Philip Kostenko was beaten on his way to work. While the evidence remains unclear, Human Rights First has held the police responsible for the attack.

The episode exemplifies how law enforcement and prosecutorial officials have exploited anti-extremism legislation to target nonviolent government critics, including journalists, independent media, human rights organizations, and artists. Kostenko is also an affiliate of the radical street-art collective Voina, which has been prosecuted in the past for its protest art.

One of Russia’s most high profile artistic protest groups, Voina most recently acted earlier in the protests. On December 31, the artists broke into a police station, placed Molotov cocktails near the tires of a police vehicle, and set it on fire, as recorded in their released video. The destruction of the tank-like vehicle, which had been used to transport prisoners, was their proclaimed “gift to all political prisoners in Russia.” The official police statement denied Voina’s involvement in the fire, saying the source was unknown and damage minimal.

A Voina activist dresses up as a cop for a protest in Voina's basement hideout. (Fred S./Flickr Creative Commons)

Voina, meaning “war” in Russian, has long stood as the symbol of the avant-garde and for the artistic resistance against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The group supports anarchy, renounces money, and ignores law. Founded in 2005 by Moscow philosophy student Oleg Vorotnikov (“Vor”) and his wife Natalia Sokol (“Kozlyenok”), the group has branches in most major Russian cities and supports a network of international activist artists such as Chinese dissident Ai Weiwei and those of Occupy Wall Street.

Political figures were the main targets of their earlier works. In one of their first public works, five members, including a pregnant woman four days from giving birth, had public sex in Moscow’s Timirayzev State Museum of Biology. The performance, called “Fuck for the heir Medved`s little Bear!”, protested the 2008 election of President Medvedev. Their other 2008 work, “In Memory of the Decemberists – A Present to Yuri Luzhkov,” staged a hanging of two homosexual men and three Central Asian guest workers. The work reflected the alleged homophobia and racism of Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow by drawing inspiration from the libertarian Decembrists, who protested against the czar over 200 years ago.

Their recent art has attacked corruption of the cops. In 2010, they spray painted a 250-foot tall penis on a St. Petersburg bridge. The looming phallus, which pointed at the F.S.B., the state security service, represented the “unconquerable Russian phallus.” Their next project, “Palace Revolution,” involved flipping over parked police cars in protest of police corruption. The alleged hooliganism of their leaders led to their arrests, from which they were release on bail only last spring with the help of British street artist Banksy.

Is it art? Is there beauty in the way the flame consumed what Voina calls “a symbol of today’s repressions and human rights and freedoms”? When does activist art simply descend into vandalism or chaos? Unless the art begins to attack the apolitical, perhaps the answer depends on legally defined boundaries. But even that is questionable amidst rampant corruption.

When does revolutionary art lose its coherence? Look at the art’s fidelity to the broader ideology: Voina’s explicit artistic-intellectual goals mix tradition with radicalism in an unclear way. They want to resurrect the Romantic artist-intellectual hero who triumphs over evil, yet reject “outmodedness and provincialism,” or the deeply romantic cultural trope of the Russian peasant that represented a rich countryside folk tradition and defined a distinctly Eastern European Romanticism. They wish for an “innovative topical art language” that can accurately talk about the “new epoch” and has “no analogues in the past,” but also draw inspiration from the old Russian laughing culture of absurdity and sarcasm as well as the 1920’s futurists.

The Voina certainly names precise goals and sources of inspiration, but the most resonant common thread is the celebration of the visceral: the direct grittiness of the carnival-street, the aggressive innovation that cuts off the past, a “lively” art, and the activist artist. Above all, they exalt an ideology of spirit. Whether a mere attitude can qualify as the basis of a coherent ideology can be questioned, but there’s something to be said about the way such radicalism can jolt the public into thought or action. “If an activist secretly burns a cop truck at night, it won’t be art. It will be the revenge of an activist,” Voina representative Plutser-Sarno wrote to online publication ARTINFO. “But to burn it openly and proclaim to the entire country: ‘I am an artist. I burned down your prison, symbol of totalitarianism. This autodafe is our art action,’ then it becomes a piece of art. We made people discuss it as an artistic action.”

Sarah Swong ’15 is in Pierson College. She is a Globalist Notebook beat blogger on topics of international art and politics. Contact her at sarah.swong@yale.edu.

by Aube Rey Lescure

The days of the empire on which the sun never sets may be over, but tell that to certain members of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and they will reply that England is still, in essence, a 21^st century mini-empire. That its mode-of-rule is borderline neocolonial.  That the taxation is unfair. That the devolution efforts are phony. Some ultranationalists will surely tell you, brimming with pathos, that Westminster—which, in 1707, ‘forced itself’ upon the Kingdom of Scotland—is holding unwilling populations hostage and denying their right to self-determination.

Scottish first minister Alex Salmond and his party, the SNP, have long pledged Scottish independence as their goal. They are now in tight negotiations with UK Prime Minister David Cameron about holding a referendum in Scotland and deciding once and for all whether the Scottish people want independence. The referendum is planned for 2014. For many Scots, independence is a three hundred-year old obsession that has permeated their culture and history but which, at the same time, a significant part of the population has grown comfortable living without. Quality of life isn’t distinctly worse because of Westminster’s authority. The Scots obtained their own Scottish Parliament in 1998—a very significant concession on the part of the UK parliament—and micromanage more or less everything they aren’t explicitly forbidden from managing.

Alex Salmond, Scottish first minister and potential liberator of Scotland? (Wikimedia Commons)

Which brings us to taxation.

Taxation can be a very dry topic, but it has also historically proven to be one ripe for nationalist fervor. The Scottish case today isn’t starkly different from its 18^th century antecedents—at its core is resentment towards a distant central authority. There is also the sense that said authority belongs to a cultural out-group and, worse, is a historical oppressor. Then add oil to the equation: after petroleum and natural gas were discovered off the Scottish shores in the North Sea almost four decades ago, the Scots went wild with anger. Imagine: England went along tranquilly pumping the oil right from under Scotland’s nose, earning huge revenue, but taxed the Scots the same as anyone else in the UK and gave them the same benefits. Pre-oil discovery and post-oil discovery, the Scots saw no substantial change in their economy. What they considered to be their wealth was being redistributed to millions of other people they had no wish to be co-citizens with.

“It’s Scotland’s Oil!” roared a 1974 SNP campaign. There is more truth to this claim than what most people imagine—the UK in fact has legislation (written before the oil was discovered) that divides the North Sea into a Scottish sphere and an English sphere. It is estimated that 80-90% of oil revenue is extracted from the parts of the oil fields that fall within the Scottish sphere. Given Scotland’s lack of sovereignty, however, the two-sphere argument was successfully ignored because the logistical and legal complications it brought forth were too much to handle for a state which, at the time, did not even have its own parliament.

Alex Salmond is building his utopian image of an independent Scotland off the platform of North Sea oil. Scotland would, in this dream scenario, vote “yes!” on the referendum and pressure England into accepting its secession. In addition to winning back all the pride and glory its ancestors had been denied, it would now own all the oil and join the exclusive league of Norway, Sweden and Finland, leading a quiet and wealthy existence, not seeking world domination but happily distributing to its 5 million citizens what previously had to be shared with 62 million people.

Is Westminster going to sit idly on the sidelines as more and more Scots get seduced by their first minister’s ingenious and glorious plan? David Cameron is in Edinburgh right now giving speeches urging the Scottish people to vote “no”. His argument is, expectably, that UK citizenship means being part of a world power and brings along the benefits of a world power—a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, NATO, a substantial defense budget, and, among other things, sound fiscal decisions like saying no to the euro. Scottish independence, said Cameron, would make him “deeply, deeply sad.”

Aube Rey Lescure ’15 is in Davenport College.  She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on E.U. affairs.  Contact her at aube.reylescure@yale.edu.

By Max Watkins

Amidst the turmoil in Egypt, forty three foreigners working at NGOs are being prosecuted for alleged election tampering and are not allowed to leave the country. Of these forty three, nineteen are Americans, including the son of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. Their detainment began in December and is causing serious strains in Egypt’s foreign relations. The United States is now threatening to withhold billions of dollars in aid. Although this situation seems to be an Egyptian foreign policy issue, it reveals much about the internal dynamics and conflicts within a country grappling with post-Mubarak politics and nascent democracy. Egypt can no longer be considered a unitary actor, as this crisis reveals the numerous factions vying for power in a seemingly anarchic system.

Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Lt. Gen. Sami Hafez Enan, chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces, on February 11th at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in Cairo to discuss the fate of the nineteen American citizens currently held within Egypt (D. Myles Cullen / US Department of Defense)

If Egypt were a unitary actor, these foreigners would never have been detained. And even if Egypt had detained them, the threat of losing billions of dollars in American aid would have made them think again. Losing American support would be devastating as Egypt tries to repair its economy. Since the detainees have not been repatriated, we can assume that there are more complicated internal politics at play. Those holding the detainees must not be the recipients of aid money. So we are likely seeing a calculated power play for control of Egypt, with the detainees as pawns.

So if Egypt is not a unitary actor, we must consider the current power brokers.

There are two main factions in Egypt: the military council and the Muslim Brotherhood. Both hold tenuous positions, as each faction is trying to cement its position and power in the new governmental system, at the expense of the other.  Whoever is controlling the status of these foreigners is trying to hurt the other faction and coerce them into some sort of action or behavior. Let us consider the two options.

With the recent elections, the Muslim Brotherhood is expanding and legitimizing its power in the new democracy. The military serves primarily as transitional leaders.  The Muslim Brotherhood has everything to gain and the military has everything to lose. The Muslim Brotherhood is probably attempting to discredit the military and in doing so eliminate its chief rival. Since the military nominally controls – Egypt, angry foreign powers will direct their attention towards the military, blaming them for anything that goes wrong. With mounting international pressure, it is likely the military will lose power and legitimacy, paving the way for the Muslim Brotherhood.

There is a slight chance that it is the military that is detaining the foreigners. Perhaps the military wants to flaunt their power within Egypt. If so, we are seeing a show of force to intimidate the Muslim Brotherhood.  However it is unlikely that the military would risk losing billions of dollars in American aid. There is also the possibility that divisions within either faction are responsible for this incident, but due to the chaotic nature of current Egyptian politics, it is difficult to understand their internal dynamics.

Regardless of who controls the detainees, a very dangerous political game has resulted. Each side is goading the other into increasingly risky moves and in a highly combustible environment like Egypt, the consequences could be dire. The Egyptian people already overthrew an entrenched dictator; they can certainly overthrow bickering factions. Whatever the case may be, the Arab Spring is far from over in Egypt.

Max Watkins ’14 is in Timothy Dwight College. He is a Yale Globalist Beat Blogger on International Conflicts. Contact him at maxwell.watkins@yale.edu.

by Caroline Tracey

One week ago, Kubanych Abdyrakhmanov, a member of the Kyrgyz civic organization All Possible Perspectives, announced at a press conference, “Citizens of Kyrgyzstan do not trust Prime Minister Omurbek Bobanov.” He was speaking on behalf of a group comprised of former casino workers who have been laid off as a result of a recent law banning gambling. The group’s members say that they have been trying to turn to their government for compensation and job-search assistance for a month and a half without receiving an audience; Abdyrakhmanov says that Babanov should be a forward-looking politician who cares about his constituents and devotedly serves them, but finds that he has none of these qualities.

Kyrgyzstan is a former Soviet state as well as a member of the Turkic Council. Among the region’s earliest settlers were Scythians; Turkic traders introduced Islam to the area as early as the seventh century. The region came under Soviet power in 1919 and seceded from it in 1991 – in spite of a vote just months before in which 88.7% of voters approved of remaining in the Soviet Union. It is notable for its wealth of resources, including water, as well as for two sets of riots in 2010: the first, in April, were protests against government corruption; the second, in June, were in South Kyrgyzstan and were clashes between the country’s two main ethnic groups, the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz.

The breakup of the Soviet Union necessarily prompted a widespread reconsideration of ethnic identity in the newly independent republics of the dissolved superpower. It’s a cliche that those who draw the lines of countries draw them imperfectly, dividing ethnic groups from their kin and uniting them with warring groups. Central Asia is no exception, and – as shown by the 2010 riots – tensions run high in Kyrgyzstan. Along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan is one of only two former Soviet republics which maintain Russian as an official language along with the local language. Kyrgyz, formerly only spoken in the home, is on the rise as a professional language. There is an insult, мырк (myrk), roughly meaning “bumpkin”, used on those who come to the city and do not speak Russian.  The use of the term incited controversy when Tata Ulan, a Kyrgyz rapper who grew up speaking Russian and had to learn Kyrgyz later in life, inverted the insult, saying, “if you grew up in the city and don’t speak Kyrgyz, you’re a myrk,” a remark that reflects the omnipresent ethnic tensions in Kyrgyz life.

Dissatisfaction with the current Prime Minister over his ethnic origins may reflect stronger democratic institutions. (Creative Commons)

Prime Minister Babanov himself has been burdened by the consequences of Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic tensions: ten days ago, MP Kamchybek Tashiev published a statement positing that Kyrgyzstan’s prime minister should be a “pure blooded Kyrgyz,” a jab specifically directed at Babanov, whose mother is of Kurdish origin. “I should say openly, and let people not be offended,” the statement reads, “that the head of government should be a pure-blooded Kyrgyz, who will actually be rooting for the interests of the country. We have been ruled by Tatars, Jews, Russians and others. With the coming to power of Babanov we are now ruled by Kurds. The man who guides the nation should be a full-blooded Kyrgyz.” It will likely be some time before the countries of the former Soviet Union, where cultures have been trading, mixing, and fighting for centuries, can govern without ethnic motivations guiding allegiance.  Still, their voicing of grievances is an exhilarating utilization of new democratic avenues.

In War and Peace, Tolstoy describes the feeling and sight of war coming to Moscow. “And above all they were merry because there was war near Moscow…something extraordinary was happening, which is always joyful for a person, especially a young one.” It is not looked favorably upon to crave or be excited by war. But there is an excitement brought about by upheaval, and it is not mere schadenfreude. More than submitting one’s vote to the ballot box, more than debating and dropping literature, the instant when citizens can create chaos – that is the democratic moment.

Caroline Tracey ’13 is in Silliman College. She is a Yale Globalist Beat Blogger on Russia and Eastern Europe.  Contact her at caroline.tracey@yale.edu

by Daniel Gordon

Twenty three years ago today, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for Salman Rushdie’s death. The author’s controversial portrayal of the prophet Mohammed in The Satanic Verses, which Khomeini never actually read, set off a war between the forces of secularism and fundamentalism that raged on and off for decades.

About two weeks ago it flared up again, this time in India, Rushdie’s homeland. Rushdie canceled his visit to the Jaipur Literary Festival—which drew such cultural luminaries as Oprah Winfrey and Tom Stoppard—after learning from intelligence officials that assassins from Mumbai might be en route to Jaipur to kill him.

Festival organizers also scrapped plans to have Rushdie appear over a video link after protestors appeared in force outside the venue where the conference was to occur. Rushdie later tweeted that he believed the intelligence received from Rajasthani officials was fabricated. Politicians have been conspicuously silent on the matter, leading some to think that they played a part in the invention of the Mumbai mafia threat. The Indian media hyped up the story, reporting on it for well over a week.

Oddly enough, Rushdie attended the same festival in Jaipur in 2007, without a problem. So why all the hullabaloo now?

“It smacks of political mileage,” declared Triveni Mathur, “because we have impending elections in Uttar Pradesh,” a state neighboring Rajasthan, where the literary festival was held. Mathur, a visiting professor of media and communication at Fergusson College in Pune, India, added, “[Uttar Pradesh] is often considered a deciding factor in political power because there is a strong minority group which is also a very strong vote bank for the Congress.”

So if elections in UP hinge on the Muslim vote, there would be good reason for politicians to prevent the alienation and polarization of the Muslim population by keeping Rushdie away. “The Congress wants to see that all sections of the society are appeased, especially the minority community that has been hurt by the writings of Salman Rushdie,” Mathur said. Her analysis agrees with the one offered by most Indian newspapers, which explain the Rushdie incident also through the lens of the election.

Raj Rao, a speaker at the festival and an author himself , is not so easily convinced: “this business of elections—that’s a cliché,” and noted ironically, “the elections are not even in Rajasthan.” Denying that one cause could explain the incident, he offered a slew of possibilities, some less mainstream than others. “There’s one view that it was all stage-managed, and I don’t entirely disbelieve that,” he commented matter-of-factly, “because a lot of people got a lot of mileage out of it, including Salman Rushdie himself.”

More plausible is Rao’s reflection that the growth of intolerance and the political “mood of the moment” explains Rushdie’s absence. The release of a fatwa calling for Taslima Nasreen’s “face to be blackened” for the recent release of her controversial autobiography supports Rao’s claim that “the right wing has found a voice” in India.

Controversy surrounding alleged threats blocking Salman Rushdie's participation in the Jaipur Literary Festival has led to national reflection on the role of religion in Indian society (Daniel Gordon)

Whether upcoming elections, a publicity stunt, or fundamentalist politics explain the Rushdie incident, all of them point to a failure of secularism in India. “It’s as if the chilies that we’re eating has made us all emotional,” said Anita Patankar, the director of the Symbiosis School for Liberal Arts in Pune. “We do not deal with dissent, with disagreements, with differing voices—we don’t deal with that rationally and logically. We’re an emotional people, and we react emotionally to things.”

Religion is a public event in India, influencing elections and taking to the streets for religious festivals like Holi or Eid ul-Fitr, so any religiously-motivated emotional sentiment—whether peaceful or violent—often spills into public spaces. Indian secularism means giving equal preference to all religions, rather than the Western brand of secularism which strives to give no preference to any religion.

Attempting to explain the Rushdie incident, Patankar—who supports the election theory explanation—disagrees with Rao on the question of increasing religious intolerance: “I don’t know whether it’s the religious intolerance, I think it’s just that in India, religion and politics are too intertwined.” For Patankar, secularism is a matter of separating temple and state: “If religion was kept personal and politics was a public service activity, you wouldn’t probably have so much of a problem.”

Even if separating politics and religion is the key to genuine secularism, the project of segregating the two might seem like wishful thinking in a country where religious tensions easily flare into communal violence, as the 2002 Gujarat riots in Mumbai illustrate, where almost a thousand people were killed, hundreds of places of worship were damaged, and tens of thousands of Hindus and Muslims fled their homes.

There were no indications, however, except declarations from a few fanatics, that any such violence would erupt over the Rushdie incident. For now, at least, it seems safe to be a follower of Rushdie in India. Says Rao, “He is our guru and we are his disciples.” That the guru could not return to his homeland shows secularism under siege. The fact that his disciples fought back, however, and that violence played no role in the affair shows that secularism is not mere rhetoric in India. It has real meaning for the people.

The Rushdie incident is the exception that proves the rule: though at times irrational voices seem to dominate its public discourse, India will continue to become more tolerant and secular, demonstrating that a nation of 1.2 billion is not too big for democracy.

Daniel Gordon ’14 is in Ezra Stiles.  He is a Globalist Beat Blogger reporting from India.  Contact him at daniel.gordon@yale.edu.

By Danielle Bella Ellison

Leaders of both Fatah and Hamas claim that the formation of a united Palestinian government will greatly benefit the Palestinian people. However, in light of the significant internal barriers to such an arrangement and, perhaps even more importantly, the projected negative reaction of the rest of the world, it is quite possible that a government that includes Hamas could be quite detrimental to the situation of the Palestinian people.

On February 6 Fatah leader and President of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas signed an agreement with Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in Doha, Qatar. What is being called the Doha Declaration or Doha Agreement stipulated that Abbas would lead a new Fatah-Hamas unity caretaker cabinet. Abbas will be the interim Prime Minister of the Palestinian unity government that, according to the agreement, should be comprised of technocrats not affiliated with either Fatah or Hamas. This government is charged with the tasks of beginning to institute policies for Gaza’s rehabilitation and setting the stage for general Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections. Although no date has yet been set for the elections, they are projected to be some time this year. Following a meeting in Cairo on February 18, the unity government is to be announced.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (UK Cabinet Office)

Many would look at this reconciliation agreement as an excellent and long sought-after breakthrough for the rival factions. Since Hamas’ violent takeover of Gaza in 2007, the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and the Fatah-controlled West Bank have been severely divided. Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and could lead to political unification of the two main Palestinian territories. Such political unification and centralization has the potential to lead to many institutional and economic benefits for the Palestinian people living in those areas. In addition, national unity is a powerful and important feeling that could in itself improve the lives of Palestinians.

Both Fatah and Hamas leaders have expressed strong commitment to the Doha Agreement. As Abbas said following the signing, the Declaration “serves the interests of the Palestinian people and Arab nation.” Nevertheless, the rifts between the leaders of each faction potentially pose significant barriers to the actual implementation of the reconciliation agreement. A number of Hamas leaders in Gaza have come out as opposed to the replacement of current PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad with Mahmoud Abbas. They state that Abbas’ serving as both President and Prime Minister of the government is a violation of Palestinian Authority Basic Law and other legal agreements. Furthermore, Gaza-based Hamas leaders, notably Ismail Haniyah who is in fact the other disputed Prime Minister of the PA, as well as Mahmoud al-Zahar who is a co-founder of Hamas, are protesting the legitimacy of the Doha Agreement. They claim that Khaled Meshal, a key Hamas leader who is however currently in exile, does not have the authority to make such a pact. This dispute brings up another key barrier in the political unification of the Palestinians: the arguable lack of proper authority of either Fatah in the West Bank or Hamas in Gaza. Without true authority or legitimacy existing, an agreement signed by Fatah and Hamas leaders could potentially have no real effect on the ground for the Palestinian people, and could in fact cause confusion and conflict.

Nevertheless, even if Fatah and Hamas manage to successfully agree on the terms of a new Palestinian unity government, and even if such a government would successfully begin to be implemented on the ground, this development could have a negative impact on Palestinians. Hamas has been deemed by the West and the Quartet on the Middle East (the U.S., Russia, the EU, and the UN) as a terrorist organization. Hamas has refused the Quartet’s mandates to renounce violence, recognize Israel, and acknowledge existing Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements. The Israeli Foreign Ministry has stated that Israel cannot negotiate for peace with an unreformed Hamas that does not recognize Israel’s existence and refuses to renounce terrorism and violence. Therefore, a Palestinian unity government including Hamas would likely lead to a complete standstill in the already floundering Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. This does not seem to be a problem for Hamas, and in fact numerous Hamas officials have explained that a key goal behind the reconciliation agreement is to be more united and “free for confronting the enemy,” as Mashaal said. However, putting all the Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza under a political authority opposed to seeking peace with Israel is detrimental to the Palestinian people on multiple levels. First, lack of peace with Israel in itself is detrimental to the daily lives of Palestinians. Violence between Hamas militants in Gaza and the Israeli Defense Forces has been ongoing, disrupting citizens’ lives on a daily basis. The reconciliation between the factions could lead to a Hamas presence in Gaza that could bring even more intense such violence to the West Bank as well. Moreover, the PA in the West Bank is currently supported both financially and militarily by Israel and various Western countries, notably the Untied States. A unification of Fatah and Hamas will very likely lead to a halting or withdrawal of aid, a development that would have severe negative impacts on Palestinians.

While political unification is generally a positive development for a people, in the case of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas it may be detrimental. The Palestinians in the West Bank in particular must decide if it is truly wise to bring into their government a terrorist organization that will impede peace talks with Israel and likely halt crucial economic and military aid to the Palestinian people.

Danielle Bella Ellison ’15 is in Davenport College. She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on the Middle East.  Contact her at danielle.ellison@yale.edu.

by Aube Rey Lescure

Free riders beware, the deadly Clinton-Panetta State-Defense duo has landed in Germany this week for the 2012 Munich Security Conference—an arrival that was expected to leave European defense ministers in disarray as they dodged the pair’s verbal bullets targeted at increasing low European defense spending and changing the continent’s dependence on U.S. military support—but wait. Put away the popcorn, nothing remotely close even happened. Clinton and Panetta indulged, instead, in heart-warming sisterly talks of reassurance with their European counterparts, pledging that Europe was still their number one strategic military ally and that they were deeply, soulfully apologetic for the U.S. withdrawal of approximately 6,000 troops from Europe—which, of course, meant no loss at all in terms of how dear Europe was to America’s heart.

What is it with the all of the sudden niceties? Americans have been annoyed and distraught by European unwillingness to invest in its own defense ever since the end of the Cold War. The conflicts in the Balkans and Kosovo in the early to mid-1990s exposed the full extent of European military weakness—the E.U. could, at best, provide peacekeeping, but struggled with effectively deploying actual combat forces. The U.S. had to return time and again to bail Europe out militarily. Even today, the U.S. has a surprising number of troops stationed in Europe, with 54,000 in Germany alone.

Clinton and Panetta’s attitude, it turned out, was serving as a counterbalance to bitter remarks by senior U.S. officials whose irritation with the current European defense situation was reignited by the Munich Security Conference.  They are not alone in their ire.

Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta at the 2012 Munich Security Conference. (Flickr Creative Commons)

Back in 2002, Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, won many hearts with his essay “Power and Weakness”, which drew national attention to the fact that Europe, according to Kagan, was happy with adopting strategies of weakness and bandwagonning behind the U.S. militarily. Kagan argued that with America’s help and at America’s expense, Europe had resolved the Kantian dilemma—that is, it succeeded in building up a supergovernment without having to worry about the security resources needed to maintain such a government. While Europeans loosened their belts and enjoyed their utopia in the snuggly western parts of the Eurasian continent, America was left to police the rest of the world.

If we follow the Kaganian argument, we arrive at the conclusion that the U.S. provides security for Europe in two ways: one visible, one invisible. The hardware, intelligence and manpower that the U.S. contributes both bilaterally to the E.U. and through NATO are the quantifiable factors; and the oft-neglected unquantifiable factor is that America’s possession of the hardware itself makes it a more likely target for those against whom it sought defense in the first place. The terrorist threat to Europe, for example is negligible compared to that of the U.S.

It’s a classic security dilemma—the more arms build-up, the more feared and resented the country. What many argue, though, is that the U.S. security dilemma is amplified by an idle Europe that is enjoying its position of weakness and the relative security that comes with it. Many U.S. hardliners thus clamor for more European military spending—the basic implication being that it will come as a relief to the United States. France currently spends around 2.4% of its GDP on military expenditures, Britain 2.7% and the U.S. 4.7%.

Now comes the time to be skeptical. The U.S. is already swallowing defense budget cuts—Panetta agreed for $487 billion to be cut over the next ten years. That, however, is already a compromise from the original goal of $500 billion. Panetta was clear on the matter: the U.S. simply cannot cut any more. America wants to maintain its current high military expenditure level. Even if the E.U. changes its mind overnight and decides to devote 5% of its GDP on defense, the U.S. probably would not make any responsive change to its own budget! Of course, it could be argued that an increase in European military expenditure would still make the U.S. relatively weaker and thus a relatively smaller target. And yet, to be realistic, those who already pose a real security threat to the U.S. are not likely to shift targets over minor, relative changes. As long as the U.S. keeps being a hegemon, it will continue to be the primary target of security threats. If, hypothetically, the E.U. started militarizing so much that it started getting all the heat—then clearly U.S. hegemony would have been significantly disturbed, which the U.S. would not allow to happen.

To be objective, then, the U.S. shouldn’t complain too much or push Europe too hard about raising military expenditures. A reasonable demand would be for Europe to at least be able to take care of its own backyard—but in terms of intervening internationally and diffusing the “target burden”, no matter how loudly the U.S. whines, it is clearly not going to take real advantage of any “relief” Europe provides.

Aube Rey Lescure ’15 is in Davenport College.  She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on E.U. affairs.  Contact her at aube.reylescure@yale.edu.

by Max Watkins

For nearly a year, the Syrian people have struggled against President Bashar al-Assad and his brutal crackdown against the popular and democratically inspired uprisings. Since last January, at least several thousand Syrians have been killed, incurring incredible international pressure for his regime to step down. Even though there is widespread international consensus that the Syrian government must stop their brutal crackdown, the body with the most gravitas on such matters, the United Nations Security Council, has failed to act to stop the Syrian government’s suppression of the uprisings.

The Syrian protest effort is urging people to gather in Damascus and other cities on March 25 for “a day of rage,” with the goal to “end the state of emergency in Syria and end corruption.” (Michael Thompson / One Love, Earth)

Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China, rarely approve resolutions that ultimately involve violating a country’s sovereignty. And in Syria’s case, this remained true, as Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution on February 4^th condemning Syria, its actions, and the call for international intervention in the country. Without the approval of the United Nations, it will be very difficult to justify and legitimize any actions that violate Syrian sovereignty.

So why did Russia and China veto the resolution?

First, both Russia and China tend to conduct their foreign policy in the realpolitik spirit. The initial question these countries ask is: how does endorsing this resolution help me? The only real benefit of supporting the resolution would be to curry favor with the other three permanent members and the international community at large. But Russia and China do not really care about this. So cross that out.

The second question would be, does endorsing this resolution hurt me? The answer to this question is an unequivocal yes. Both countries face challenges to their own internal sovereignty in several ways. Russia currently has its own protests and uprisings over the recent presidential election where many accuse Vladimir Putin of flouting democratic protocols and stealing the election. We can see how the move away from democracy in Russia angers many Russians. Putin undoubtedly sees what has happened to dictators and non-democratic leaders in the Middle East and North Africa and like Assad, he is clamping down on unrest in his country.

Furthermore, in the past several years, Russia has made it a policy to send in the military to unruly regions, such as Chechnya and Georgia. Russia quashes its own protests and therefore will not question the authority of other governments who do the same. Likewise, China faces unrest in Tibet and in its eastern coastal cities as a slowing economy makes many Chinese question the communist government’s leadership and ability to deliver on its promises for prosperity for all. China has also been accused of abusing human rights for years and will not condemn another nation for doing the same thing.

Due to the internal situations in both countries, the Russian and Chinese governments cannot and will not endorse a resolution that violates a country’s sovereignty to support rebellion against non-democratic forces, as any such resolution would be hypocritical.

The veto of the Security Council resolution does not really tell us much about the internal situation of Syria. Rather, this resolution reveals the true level of serious unrest and the potential for rebellion in Russia and China and the fear that the Arab Spring has instilled in autocratic governments throughout the world.

Max Watkins ’14 is in Timothy Dwight College. He is a Yale Globalist Beat Blogger on International Conflicts. Contact him at maxwell.watkins@yale.edu.

by Caroline Tracey

At Yale, it’s Sex Week, every coitus-obsessed Eli’s favorite opportunity to gab for eight days straight about hookups, bedroom triumphs, and cringe-when-recounting failures. In Russia, it’s still the real world, where there is more than one topic of casual conversation, and there is also quite a lot going on. But lucky for us, sex has entered into those goings-on this week, and makes for a good conversation.

Last Thursday, the anti-Putin protests at the Kremlin received a performance from eight members of Pussy Riot, a female band formed in September as a reaction to the news that Putin intended to return to the Russian presidency. The group hides their faces behind neon ski masks, using anonymity to enforce the idea that they could be anybody. As the Guardian reports, “Their average age is 25. They are hardcore feminists. Most studied the humanities in university. They won’t detail their day jobs.” The band cites its major influences as America’s riot grrl bands of the 1990’s – Bikini Kill, Huggy Bear (from England), and Heavens to Betsy. Riot grrl’s political agenda was nearly exclusively feminist-focused. At its origin it tried to create a sphere of punk that was welcoming to girls and to provide a means for girls to speak out about issues such as abusive relationships and body image. The lead singers of some of the bands raised their notoriety by writing “SLUT” on their bodies for performances. In Russia, the issues at stake are not just women’s issues, but the members of Pussy Riot see a special role for women in the current protests. “The revolution should be done by women,” said one member, going by the name grazhdana, or citizens: “for now, they don’t beat or jail us as much.”

Pussy Riot is the latest in a long tradition of female rabble-rousers, a tradition reflected by the poetry penned by female dissident Anna Akhmatova about suffering under Stalin:

“Even if they clamp shut my tormented mouth

Through which one hundred million people scream;

That’s how I wish them to remember me when I am dead

On the eve of my remembrance day.” (from Requiem,” 1935-1961)

The group’s lyrics put a modern-day twist on the poetry of past eras:

“revolt in Russia – the charisma of protest / revolt in Russia, Putin’s got scared!”

“Egyptian air is good for the lungs / Do Tahrir on Red Square!”

During the terror of the early Soviet Union, it was up to intellectual dissidents such as Akhmatova to keep alive the hope and emotion of the Russian people, as well as to chronicle it. She and all her contemporaries suffered for carrying that burden: Akhmatova recalled that when she went to the train station to see off those being exiled, she could not walk two steps without running into another friend to whom she must bid farewell. Her first husband was shot three years after they were divorced; her son spent ten years in a Siberian prison camp; her third husband died in a gulag. Her contemporaries Mayakovsky and Yesenin committed suicide, along with her “sister poet” Marina Tsvetaeva, whose husband and daughter had been taken to prison camps.

Hardcore feminist groups in Russia take part in the wider protests against the Putin regime (Flickr Creative Commons)

Now it’s hard to imagine a Russia where the poets are treated so brutally, or even where they can drum up such controversy as to attract the government. That incendiary torch has been passed to activist-artists such as Pussy Riot, who take their cues both from their Russian predecessors and other global figures.

It’s not only Pussy Riot, either, who are using sex to participate in activism in contemporary Russia. Last April, an art group called Voina (war) whitewashed a 65-meter penis on a drawbridge in St. Petersburg, such that when the bridge was raised the erect phallus would point to the local headquarters of the FSB (the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB). Alexander Donskoi, former mayor of the northern city of Arkhangelsk, opened Russia’s first sex museum in Moscow last June; he had beaten a candidate from Putin’s party by a narrow margin in the mayoral election and shortly thereafter been imprisoned (for falsifying his academic qualifications) when he announced his ambition to run for President. At the museum he promotes sexual freedom in a progressive and multi-faceted way: on one hand, he creates open discourse in a country where there is no sex education in schools but where there is one the world’s largest prostitution industries; on the other, sex is used as a medium for political messages. One of the museum’s paintings depicts Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama, both naked, sparring; Obama holds a wad of dollars, and Putin, who is painted with two phalluses, is surrounded by oil and gas.

Donskoi, Voina, and Pussy Riot are oriented towards the media with a power and relevance that the practitioners of the old intellectual arts–modern-day Akhmatovas–no longer hold. They don’t spend hours in exile researching Pushkin to advance their art, but dissident intellectuals haven’t ceased to exist in Russia – they’ve just turned pop.

Caroline Tracey ’13 is in Silliman College. She is a Yale Globalist Beat Blogger on Russia and Eastern Europe.  Contact her at caroline.tracey@yale.edu

By Aube Rey Lescure:

As the Clintons, David Cameron and other famous politicos gathered in Prague this December to attend the late Czech leader Vaclav Havel’s funeral, French president Nicholas Sarkozy’s mind was more in Turkey than in Central Europe. Despite the funeral’s beauty and solemnity, it was the image of western unity that contrasted most sharply with the fuming crowds and protests led outside the Turkish French embassy, where Turks angrily brandished posters of Sarkozy’s face. In his hotel room Sarkozy allowed time for an emergency interview by national chain France Television; his slow theatrical voice repeating the words “morals” and “principles” with infinite gravity.

Our poor friend Sarkozy—who hopes to be re-elected in 2012—is already France’s favorite object of disdain and criticism. Now a high-profile public spat with Turkey over the recognition of the Armenian genocide has led to a formal diplomatic fracture and suspension of military cooperation between the two countries. The French senate has just passed a bill criminalizing the denial of genocides, and although it is not name-calling Turkey in specific the Turks have taken up the issue with an intense sentiment of victimization. The alleged Armenian genocide (which is widely recognized to be one, although the U.S. has never agreed to affirm or negate the specific use of the term ‘genocide’) occurred almost a century ago, when Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were deported and massacred on a large scale during and after WWI. The Turks claim, however, that it wasn’t on a large enough of a scale to be called ‘genocide’. Rather, they’d like to think about it as a military measure used for the purpose of national defense. Naturally, both the young Turks protesting en masse in the streets and the current Turkish statesmen were not alive at the time of the massacres, but they share a patriotic passion for defending this particular controversy in Turkish history.

Regardless of the legitimacy of word-use, the most striking moment of this December debacle was when the Turkish Premier Recep Tayyid Erdogan gave a press conference that constituted mainly of personal attacks on Sarkozy and tu quoque arguments condemning France for genocide in Algeria. Sarkozy, Erdogan claimed, was trying to win re-election support by spurring “Islamophobia” and “Turkophobia”.

Sarkozy has come under fire for his views on a recent French law criminalizing the denial of genocide. (Flickr Creative Commons/World Economic Forum)

That’s the type of statement that turns world politics into a playground fight. I’m sure all that French voters have on their minds is how to elect a good old-school Muslim and Turkey-hater. The Turkish Premier’s words are, nonetheless, equally alarming because they reflect the long-standing Turkish sentiment of being marginalized by the EU. Most of the western world is now counting on Turkey to act as a regional stabilizer (did anyone say Syria?) and work to counterbalance Iran in the Middle East; and Sarkozy’s G8 colleagues certainly weren’t too thrilled that he was igniting Turkish anti-Europeanism over a historical debate—but then again, genocide is genocide and no one could really come out and tell the French to quit beating a dead horse. Sarkozy certainly tried to emerge as a martyr out of all this, asserting that he wasn’t going to trade his morals and principles over certain economic or military advantages with Turkey.

Whether or not the whole issue was orchestrated to shed light on Sarkozy’s righteousness has naturally become the talk of France’s conspiracy theorists. These same people had already kindly accused the Bruni-Sarkozy couple of “planning Carla’s pregnancy” as a campaign move—everyone loves babies, right?  The Turkish ambassador, for his part, couldn’t board a flight out of Paris to Ankara without noting that Sarkozy was “making things very difficult for the next French president, who will have to try very hard to repair relations with Turkey,” a sour parting shot sure to characterize the future of the Franco-Turkish relationship.

Aube Rey Lescure ’15 is in Davenport College.  She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on E.U. affairs.  Contact her at aube.reylescure@yale.edu.