The Globalist Notebook

By Max Watkins

This month marks the one-year anniversary of the civil war in Syria, pitting the forces of the autocratic President Assad against the democratic yearning rebels. 10,000 civilians have already died as riots have now turned into open conflict and military sieges of city centers. While Assad blames terrorists and other boogey-men for the unrest and attempts to downplay the violence initiated on his behalf, there is no doubt that he is the one behind the military-led attacks on his people. And with social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, providing the outside world with a clear window into the death and destruction, the international community is in uproar over Assad and his military’s actions. But given the international outcry and condemnation, why has no one intervened in Syria to protect its civilians and overthrow Assad?

The president of the Syrian Arab Republic, Bashar Al-Assad (Wikimedia Commons).

The situation in Syria is eerily similar to the one in Libya last summer, where longtime dictator Colonel Qaddafi and rebel forces were locked in a civil war, with civilians in the crossfire. But in the Libyan situation, the United Nations Security Council condemned and effectively authorized intervening in Libya through Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Led by France and the United Kingdom, with the heavy support of the United States, the rebels and civilians were aided and protected, and Qaddafi was overthrown. But with Syria, there has been no UN Security Council Resolution and no intervention.

There are several reasons why no one has come to the Syrian people’s aid.

First, having the UN Security Council issue a Resolution condemning Syria would lend legitimacy to any actions taken by an outside government to intervene in the country and violate its sovereignty. This did not happen, so it is unlikely any state will intervene. No Resolution was passed because two of the five permanent members, Russia and China, vetoed the motion. They were unusually agreeable with the Libyan resolution, but in that situation, none of their interests were being threatened. However in the Syrian case, Russia has long-standing ties dating back to the Soviet Union and the Cold War era. Russia will not tolerate any western nations interfering in its perceived sphere of influence, so it vetoed the Security Council Resolution. Also, Putin won, with doubtful legality, the recent presidential election in Russia. He is eager to throw his weight around once again and deny the desires of western countries. China and Russia generally agree on Security Council Resolutions so we can assume that China followed Russia’s lead.

Second, part of the reason why France, the UK, and the US were so eager to intervene in Libya was because their three domestic leaders, Sarkozy, Cameron, and Obama, were all eager to establish their foreign policy credentials and prowess. When there is trouble at home, a very easy way to boost your popularity and reputation is to go to war (and presumably win). This happened in Libya, but Europe’s troubles have only gotten worse since last summer, as the very existence of the Euro and European Union are in question. So while these European countries are quick to condemn Assad, the political will and capital necessary for military intervention no longer exists as domestic issues have stolen the leader’s attention. And with President Obama dealing with a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and an upcoming election, his focus is not on intervening in another Middle Eastern country.

Third, Libya was a major oil producer, with its oil fueling much of Europe. Syria, however, is not a major oil producer. In fact, it is projected that Syria will soon become a net importer of oil this decade. During the Libyan Civil War, oil production and shipments ceased, raising the price of oil worldwide. But with the overthrow of Qaddafi, oil production rebounded. And lowering the price of oil, and thus gas, is something politicians and leaders are increasingly pressured to do in a time of rising prices at the pump. While never overtly stated as a reason for intervention in Libya, its oil must have been a strong incentive to intervene. But given that Syria has no real oil production, western countries do not feel compelled to intervene to ensure a steady flow of oil.

We can see that the Libyan intervention was only possible due to a unique set of circumstances; it was the exception. In Syria’s case, the lack of legitimacy of an intervention and no compelling domestic reasons in western countries to intervene leaves Syria on its own; this is generally how interventions fail to happen. For the foreseeable future, only time will tell if the rebels can defeat the brutal and increasingly desperate attacks by the forces of President Assad without outside support.

Max Watkins ’14 is in Timothy Dwight College. He is a Yale Globalist Beat Blogger on International Conflicts. Contact him at maxwell.watkins@yale.edu.

By Danielle Bella Ellison

The Iron Dome, a revolutionary mobile air missile defense system, saved tens of Israeli lives last week during the barrage of rocket attacks from terrorists in Gaza. The engineers and politicians behind the installation of the Iron Dome batteries certainly deserve congratulations. Nevertheless, this success has potentially provided a misleading sense of security, particularly in light of the possibility of far more severe attacks from Iran and its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Iron Dome’s preventing Israeli casualties has the problematic consequence that, at least to the wider international community, the week-long military confrontation between the Israel Defense Forces and the Islamic Jihad and Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza could seem more one-sided.

The Iron Dome system, designed to intercept rockets aimed at Israeli civilians, first operated successfully on April 7, 2011. The system’s capabilities were again tested on March 9, 2012 when a rocket barrage was initiated upon southern Israel. The rocket attacks lasted more than one week, including renewed rounds when Islamic terrorists in Gaza broke the cease-fire agreement achieved after the first four days of violence. The Iron Dome successfully intercepted rockets aimed at cities in southern Israel, such as Be’er Sheva and Ashdod, with a success rate of about 70%. Since the system shoots down only rockets that are calculated to be heading towards population centers, there was still much destruction in southern Israel as rockets hit farms, factories, and other buildings.

The Iron Dome system is powerful defensive mechanism to prevent rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. (Israel Defense Forces).

Despite the due praise appropriate for the Iron Dome’s prevention of Israeli casualties during this most recent episode of violence, it would be dangerous to allow this success to provide too high a sense of security. This past week the Iron Dome intercepted missiles coming from a single front. Furthermore, these missiles were being fired by Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees, two terrorist organizations with far fewer funds and far less sophisticated weapons systems than Hezbollah, Hamas, and certainly Iran itself (although some claim that Iran was encouraging the Islamic Jihadists, Tehran was reportedly not providing the terrorists with direct support). There is an increasing likelihood of an Israeli pre-emptive attack on facilities in Iran that are most likely developing nuclear weapons. Such an attack would undoubtedly lead to Iranian retaliation towards Israelis, either in the form of direct attacks or more likely, attacks by Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran’s terrorist proxies in Lebanon and the Gaza strip respectively. Unfortunately, Israeli officials and military experts speculate that the Iron Dome system is not nearly comprehensive and developed enough to stand such a multi-fronted, Iranian-backed attack. The Israel Defense Forces is working tirelessly to extend and improve the air missile defense system. Currently there are four Iron Dome batteries operating in Israel, with a fifth one scheduled to be delivered next month. However, a key problem is the geographical limitations of any single battery; a much tighter network of batteries would be necessary to provide complete coverage of a given area. The Knesset’s (Israeli Parliament) Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee estimated that about thirteen Iron Dome batteries would be needed to protect all of Israel. Even still, the Iron Dome works well only within a range of seventy kilometers. Other missile defense systems are necessary to halt longer-range missiles and rockets, which unfortunately Iran and thus Hezbollah and Hamas possess.

In addition, the success of the Iron Dome in saving Israeli lives this past week, while of course wonderful, has potentially harmful effects on the perception of Israel in the international community. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed tens of Palestinian terrorists who were behind the attack, while, thanks to both IDF defenses and extensive alarm warning and bomb shelter systems in southern Israeli communities, there were no Israeli casualties. The consequence of such disparate casualty outcomes is not a new one for Israelis. Despite the sinister goals of the terrorists in Gaza in contrast to the IDF’s goal of merely protecting Israeli civilians, when the Palestinians sustain far more casualties than the Israelis, they could appear the victims.

The Iron Dome is one of numerous IDF projects working to protect the lives of Israeli civilians in the face of terrorism and attacks from neighboring countries and territories. The significant recent success of the Iron Dome missile defense system is certainly encouraging, and more energy and funds are currently being put towards the building of more batteries and development of the anti-missile technology employed. Nevertheless, the Iron Dome is only a defense system, which, even if it eventually achieves a near 100% success rate, cannot achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians or any other groups. Ultimately, other means, possibly military but hopefully primarily diplomatic, will have to be employed to achieve true peace in the region.

Danielle Bella Ellison ’15 is in Davenport College. She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on events in the Middle East. Contact her at danielle.ellison@yale.edu.

by Aube Rey Lescure

“I never reveal my sauces”, replies a yellow-faced Julian Assange to the eager-looking Marge when asked about his barbecue recipe on The Simpsons’ latest episode. The sly and greasy-haired WikiLeaks founder then disappears into a heavily barricaded and faintly Uluru-esque grotto after surreptitiously pressing the pass-code “1234”.

Indeed—despite an apparent lack of time for coiffure-related hygiene, Assange managed to record the Simpsons episode from a secret location in the UK, where he is held under house arrest. There seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel in terms of when Assange can extract himself from the sexual-assault related quagmire, even if he at all can regain any sort of freedom for the remainder of his life. The much-hyped “rape charges” concerning two women in Sweden may bring forth Assange’s extradition to Sweden—which, for Assange, would be like having his head delivered to his enemies on a silver platter.

Assange has never budged in his vehement denial of the sexual assaults, which he claims to be a Swedish political plot against him.  Assange is not a big fan of the Swedes, especially of their media and political elite, and the feeling is most certainly reciprocated. If extradition to Sweden does occur, however, Assange would probably rather spend a few years in a Swedish prison than face a much grimmer alternative—extradition to the U.S., where he has been branded, among other things, as a “terrorist.”

Assange, many a government’s nightmare, is wanted on ‘Red Notice’ by Interpol. (Wikimedia Commons)

In a recent Rolling Stone interview, Assange exudes a sense of helplessness and martyrdom that isn’t completely groundless if one thinks about the dangers an extradition to Sweden or the U.S. would entail. Americans are unlikely to be kind in the event of an espionage trial; the words “death penalty” have even been thrown around. But Assange, quite characteristically, does not plan on going down without a bang. He has recently made quite overt charges that the Swedish former Prime Minister and current Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, is a U.S. spy.  Bildt, according to Assange, began his career as an informant in 1973 and has close ties with Karl Rove, Bush Jr.’ senior adviser and deputy chief of staff. WikiLeaks purportedly has evidence. Bildt responded by daring WikiLeaks to publish the “damning report.”

Aside from what has been called a “smear campaign” against Sweden’s political elite, Assange and WikiLeaks have also reportedly been involved in investigations and monitoring of a few of Sweden’s media personages. The aim, in this instance, would be to find evidence proving that these journalists and press figures had been paid-off to report negatively on Assange and WikiLeaks. One of the main characters involved is Thomas Mattson, the editor of Expressen, the newspaper that first published the sexual assault allegations against Assange.

The chances that Assange can prove the alleged Swedish conspiracy are exceedingly slim. No matter whether you believe him to be an international villain or a champion of free speech, the overwhelming likelihood is that he is going to end up in a bad place. Assange himself is hardly optimistic about his future: the U.S., he told his Rolling Stone interviewer, is lurking in the dark, waiting to pounce once the waters of the Swedish case have calmed. Surely they won’t let him get away. This, coming from a man now spending his third month hiding in the British countryside, sounds chillingly convincing.

Aube Rey Lescure ’15 is in Davenport College.  She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on E.U. affairs.  Contact her at aube.reylescure@yale.edu.

by Rachel Brown

Better known for sun, sand, and scuba than for street protests, the Maldives, a nation composed of approximately 1,200 islands in the Indian Ocean, has recently become the site of political unrest. The trouble in the Maldives began two weeks ago, when then-president Mohamed Nasheed resigned from office. Nasheed initially indicated that his resignation was voluntary, but later claimed he had been forced from office at gunpoint as part of a coup instigated by supporters of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the autocratic former president of the Maldives. Following Nasheed’s resignation, Mohammed Waheed Hassan, the nation’s vice-president, assumed power. Nasheed maintains that Hassan was one of the coup’s co-conspirators, but the new government denies allegations that any such coup occurred. Interestingly, Hassan recently appointed Gayoom’s daughter and a number of Gayoom’s former ministers to his new cabinet.

Nasheed, the country’s first democratically-elected president, is best known abroad for his environmental advocacy and efforts to raise awareness about the harm rising sea-levels would bring to the low-lying Maldives (he even held a cabinet meeting underwater). Domestically, however, concerns have been raised over his government’s commitment to policies in line with the dictates of Islam, the state religion. Tourism accounts for a large portion of the Maldivian economy, and different religious rules are enforced on “resort islands” than in the rest of the country. For example, alcohol and pork are banned in most of the Maldives, but not on the islands where luxury hotels operate. Some more conservative Maldivians would like to see alcohol sales prohibited entirely. Massage parlors and spas are another source of controversy, as some claim such businesses are mere fronts for prostitution. Last December, in light of these concerns, members of Islamic political parties and other opposition groups organized anti-government protests that were attended by thousands.

Another dispute arose when Nasheed’s government permitted an Israeli airline to land in the country, a move that caused one of the major Islamic parties, Adhaalath, to abandon Nasheed’s coalition. Nasheed and his followers claim that these accusations are a smear tactic designed to mar his image with more religious Maldivians. The results of a post-resignation search of Nasheed’s residence, however, did turn up bottles of illegal alcohol.

President Nasheed (right) while in office. (Flickr Creative Commons)

Declining tourism in the region has hit the Maldivian economy hard, dealing a further blow to Nasheed’s popularity. More recently, protests flared in the capital city of Male over Nasheed’s order to arrest a judge accused of corruption and interference on behalf of former President Gayoom. It was these demonstrations that culminated in Nasheed’s resignation.

But, his resignation has only brought more unrest. On February 9^th, two days after he stepped down, a warrant was issued for Nasheed’s arrest. Despite the warrant, Nasheed rallied hundreds of his supporters for a demonstration the following day. Violent clashes between Nasheed’s supporters and the police have occurred in Male and the southern city of Addu, and Nasheed maintains that approximately 350 of his supporters have been detained since the riots began.

Much to Nasheed’s disappointment, both the U.S. and India have recognized the legitimacy of the new government. UN officials and other diplomats have traveled to the Maldives and met with both leaders, but thus far no compromise has emerged.

The Maldives isn’t exactly a large or well-known country, so why is anyone besides prospective tourists getting so concerned over the recent unrest? One reason is that the Maldives are located on a central shipping lane for much of the world’s oil supply – in particular oil being sent from the Middle East to China. Even before the current turmoil, both India and China recognized the strategic importance of the islands and had been working to increase their respective influences there. Nasheed, however, indicated opposition to a growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean, saying last year, “We are not receptive to any installation, military or otherwise, in the Indian Ocean, specially from un-traditional friends. The Indian Ocean is the Indian Ocean.” Perhaps the new government will take a friendlier stance.

Others worry that the protests preceding Nasheed’s resignation represent a turn towards more radical interpretations of Islam in the Maldives. Nasheed has warned that an increasing number of Maldivian youths are coming under the influence of extremist groups from Pakistan. No terrorist attacks have occurred in the country since 2007, but the threat of increased radicalization on the islands worries India. In particular, there is concern that terrorist groups could use the islands as staging points for attacks in India.

Although the broader consequences the protests remain to be seen, a clear disruption in the Maldivian tourism industry has already occurred. Worries about unrest and increasing religious extremism have led visitors to cancel planned vacations and the Maldivian tourism industry faces possible losses of $100 million in upcoming months. The outlook for these tropical islands no longer seems so sunny.

Rachel Brown ’15 is in Saybrook College. She blogs about current events in South Asia, and has also reported on China  for the print version of the Globalist. Contact her at rachel.brown@yale.edu.

by Aube Rey Lescure

It’s a full-on custody battle: who gets to keep the oil? The Queen? The pound? The debt? The diplomats? The submarine-launched ballistic missiles?

Crafting a referendum is no small task; it is a game of nerves, timing and presentation. When a nation’s unity at stake, even the smallest detail on the ballot can have a non-negligible effect.  Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond and UK Prime Minister David Cameron are, as of today, still engaged in psychological warfare about how to best manipulate the Scottish electorate in their respective favors.

First and foremost is the question of what exactly would appear on the ballot of a Scottish referendum for independence. Wording matters, and it can have an immense impact on the outcome of the vote. Salmond and Cameron bitterly disagree on the formulation of the referendum, and their preferences can, at first, seem counterintuitive: Salmond wants the Scots to be able to choose amongst the three options of staying with the UK, “devo max” and independence. Cameron wants “devo max” scratched off the ballot, leaving the Scots with only the black-and-white choice of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to independence.

What is “devo max”, and why on earth would Cameron be against it if it can split the Scottish vote on independence and maintain UK unity? Upon closer inspection, devo max—maximum devolution—could actually be a much better alternative to independence for the Scots. Maximum devolution is somewhat of a dream middle-ground between remaining with the UK and complete independence: the Scots would get all the benefits of independence while getting rid of its inconveniences. Alex Salmond’s utopian North Sea oil and taxation scheme? Scotland would get it with devo max. David Cameron’s argument that Scotland can benefit from the UK’s defense industry and its diplomatic influence? Scotland would retain these anyways with devo max. Maximum devolution is essentially independence minus having to worry about defense and foreign affairs. It’s easy to see why Westminster isn’t too enthralled by the idea—Scotland would be like an estranged wife living on her own but still freely feeding off the joint bank account.

There is also a subtler psychological dimension to Cameron’s urge for a yes-or-no vote.  With the option of “devo max” on the ballot, a lot of Scots might choose to settle for this attractive middle-ground. Alternatively, a lot of excited young nationalists and old kilt-wearing patriots and, for that matter, any other Scot, could well decide “the hell with it, I don’t get to create a new country everyday” and go along with independence simply for the historic gravity of it. It is the least likely that a majority of Scots, given three options, would choose to remain with the UK. To get rid of “devo max” and force the Scots into a “yes-no” dilemma is likely to swing the voters who find independence too radical and would have otherwise voted for “devo max” into voting “no.”

Cameron will have to prove a master strategist in order to manipulate the referendum in his interest. (Wikimedia Commons)

Cameron has, in the past week, also turned up the pressure on Salmond with respect to the timing of the referendum. Salmond had planned it for 2014, claiming that three years had to be allowed for the Scots to debate and settle all of the logistics of independence. Cameron is pushing for a much more imminent date—since 2012 seems improbable, he has his eyes set on 2013. This might also appear counterintuitive at first sight—why would Cameron want the Scots to potentially secede sooner rather than later? It is, again, a psychological tactic that aims to take advantage of the element of surprise. A certain portion of Scottish voters might currently have been caught off-guard by the referendum’s ascendance to international attention. They might still be insecure about how Scotland would fare once independent. However, give Salmond three more years to create an elaborate platform for how Scotland would operate once independent, and even the sturdiest unionists might be persuaded that independence is, after all, not that infeasible of a plan.

Next comes the problem of numbers: how many Scots does it take to validate the ‘yes’? This issue has, in fact, already been bitterly debated back in 1978, when the Scots held a referendum on devolution. At the time 52% of voters were in favor and 48% were against, but the overall voting turnout had only been 63.6%, meaning that only 32.9% of the overall population had effectively voted yes. Westminster had set a threshold of 40%, so the UK parliament did not recognize the referendum. In response to the popular outcry, it was argued that the 36.4% who did not vote had been warned that abstaining was the equivalent of voting “no.”  One thing UK unionists can take full advantage of, therefore, is the intricacy of numbers, preferably combined with efforts to force Salmond to hold the referendum as soon as possible. If Westminster sets the validation threshold to be 50%–or even 40%–and makes the Scots vote before Salmond finalizes a neat and beautiful master plan, then the SNP has a good chance of not seeing its numbers met. Nationalist exuberance may seem high right now due to an outspoken minority, but no one can be sure that the silent masses are ready to relinquish UK-related benefits. If, however, Westminster does not aptly manipulate the result threshold and referendum date, unionism in Scotland might diminish with each coming day.

Lastly, a pressing question lingers: can Scotland obtain its independence through a mere referendum? Isn’t it too easy? Just because Salmond and the SNP rode a wave of popularity into Holyrood, three hundred years of union will now come to an end?

It is true that a Scottish referendum by no means has any binding power on the English legislature. Westminster could have, upon first hearing about Salmond’s proposal, turned its head and sneered, declaring it a non-issue. Utter rigidity might have roused some growls but would have left the SNP with few more radical options to pursue. Instead, David Cameron shot himself in the foot by responding with concern and touring Scotland and holding rounds after rounds of negotiations. By making Westminster and 10 Downing St. so involved in the crafting of the referendum, Cameron essentially gives it a validity it could not have otherwise obtained. And yet, perhaps the move is wise—if Cameron succeeds in securing only the “yes-no” option, a referendum date of 2013 and a relatively high voting percentage threshold—he might see returns to his risk-taking and induce a referendum with a majority of “no”s. If that is the case, then we won’t hear about Scottish independence for a long, long time.

Aube Rey Lescure ’15 is in Davenport College.  She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on E.U. affairs.  Contact her at aube.reylescure@yale.edu.

by Sarah Swong:

On the eve of antigovernment protests scheduled for February 4^th in St. Petersburg, political activist Philip Kostenko was beaten on his way to work. While the evidence remains unclear, Human Rights First has held the police responsible for the attack.

The episode exemplifies how law enforcement and prosecutorial officials have exploited anti-extremism legislation to target nonviolent government critics, including journalists, independent media, human rights organizations, and artists. Kostenko is also an affiliate of the radical street-art collective Voina, which has been prosecuted in the past for its protest art.

One of Russia’s most high profile artistic protest groups, Voina most recently acted earlier in the protests. On December 31, the artists broke into a police station, placed Molotov cocktails near the tires of a police vehicle, and set it on fire, as recorded in their released video. The destruction of the tank-like vehicle, which had been used to transport prisoners, was their proclaimed “gift to all political prisoners in Russia.” The official police statement denied Voina’s involvement in the fire, saying the source was unknown and damage minimal.

A Voina activist dresses up as a cop for a protest in Voina's basement hideout. (Fred S./Flickr Creative Commons)

Voina, meaning “war” in Russian, has long stood as the symbol of the avant-garde and for the artistic resistance against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The group supports anarchy, renounces money, and ignores law. Founded in 2005 by Moscow philosophy student Oleg Vorotnikov (“Vor”) and his wife Natalia Sokol (“Kozlyenok”), the group has branches in most major Russian cities and supports a network of international activist artists such as Chinese dissident Ai Weiwei and those of Occupy Wall Street.

Political figures were the main targets of their earlier works. In one of their first public works, five members, including a pregnant woman four days from giving birth, had public sex in Moscow’s Timirayzev State Museum of Biology. The performance, called “Fuck for the heir Medved`s little Bear!”, protested the 2008 election of President Medvedev. Their other 2008 work, “In Memory of the Decemberists – A Present to Yuri Luzhkov,” staged a hanging of two homosexual men and three Central Asian guest workers. The work reflected the alleged homophobia and racism of Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow by drawing inspiration from the libertarian Decembrists, who protested against the czar over 200 years ago.

Their recent art has attacked corruption of the cops. In 2010, they spray painted a 250-foot tall penis on a St. Petersburg bridge. The looming phallus, which pointed at the F.S.B., the state security service, represented the “unconquerable Russian phallus.” Their next project, “Palace Revolution,” involved flipping over parked police cars in protest of police corruption. The alleged hooliganism of their leaders led to their arrests, from which they were release on bail only last spring with the help of British street artist Banksy.

Is it art? Is there beauty in the way the flame consumed what Voina calls “a symbol of today’s repressions and human rights and freedoms”? When does activist art simply descend into vandalism or chaos? Unless the art begins to attack the apolitical, perhaps the answer depends on legally defined boundaries. But even that is questionable amidst rampant corruption.

When does revolutionary art lose its coherence? Look at the art’s fidelity to the broader ideology: Voina’s explicit artistic-intellectual goals mix tradition with radicalism in an unclear way. They want to resurrect the Romantic artist-intellectual hero who triumphs over evil, yet reject “outmodedness and provincialism,” or the deeply romantic cultural trope of the Russian peasant that represented a rich countryside folk tradition and defined a distinctly Eastern European Romanticism. They wish for an “innovative topical art language” that can accurately talk about the “new epoch” and has “no analogues in the past,” but also draw inspiration from the old Russian laughing culture of absurdity and sarcasm as well as the 1920’s futurists.

The Voina certainly names precise goals and sources of inspiration, but the most resonant common thread is the celebration of the visceral: the direct grittiness of the carnival-street, the aggressive innovation that cuts off the past, a “lively” art, and the activist artist. Above all, they exalt an ideology of spirit. Whether a mere attitude can qualify as the basis of a coherent ideology can be questioned, but there’s something to be said about the way such radicalism can jolt the public into thought or action. “If an activist secretly burns a cop truck at night, it won’t be art. It will be the revenge of an activist,” Voina representative Plutser-Sarno wrote to online publication ARTINFO. “But to burn it openly and proclaim to the entire country: ‘I am an artist. I burned down your prison, symbol of totalitarianism. This autodafe is our art action,’ then it becomes a piece of art. We made people discuss it as an artistic action.”

Sarah Swong ’15 is in Pierson College. She is a Globalist Notebook beat blogger on topics of international art and politics. Contact her at sarah.swong@yale.edu.

by Aube Rey Lescure

The days of the empire on which the sun never sets may be over, but tell that to certain members of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and they will reply that England is still, in essence, a 21^st century mini-empire. That its mode-of-rule is borderline neocolonial.  That the taxation is unfair. That the devolution efforts are phony. Some ultranationalists will surely tell you, brimming with pathos, that Westminster—which, in 1707, ‘forced itself’ upon the Kingdom of Scotland—is holding unwilling populations hostage and denying their right to self-determination.

Scottish first minister Alex Salmond and his party, the SNP, have long pledged Scottish independence as their goal. They are now in tight negotiations with UK Prime Minister David Cameron about holding a referendum in Scotland and deciding once and for all whether the Scottish people want independence. The referendum is planned for 2014. For many Scots, independence is a three hundred-year old obsession that has permeated their culture and history but which, at the same time, a significant part of the population has grown comfortable living without. Quality of life isn’t distinctly worse because of Westminster’s authority. The Scots obtained their own Scottish Parliament in 1998—a very significant concession on the part of the UK parliament—and micromanage more or less everything they aren’t explicitly forbidden from managing.

Alex Salmond, Scottish first minister and potential liberator of Scotland? (Wikimedia Commons)

Which brings us to taxation.

Taxation can be a very dry topic, but it has also historically proven to be one ripe for nationalist fervor. The Scottish case today isn’t starkly different from its 18^th century antecedents—at its core is resentment towards a distant central authority. There is also the sense that said authority belongs to a cultural out-group and, worse, is a historical oppressor. Then add oil to the equation: after petroleum and natural gas were discovered off the Scottish shores in the North Sea almost four decades ago, the Scots went wild with anger. Imagine: England went along tranquilly pumping the oil right from under Scotland’s nose, earning huge revenue, but taxed the Scots the same as anyone else in the UK and gave them the same benefits. Pre-oil discovery and post-oil discovery, the Scots saw no substantial change in their economy. What they considered to be their wealth was being redistributed to millions of other people they had no wish to be co-citizens with.

“It’s Scotland’s Oil!” roared a 1974 SNP campaign. There is more truth to this claim than what most people imagine—the UK in fact has legislation (written before the oil was discovered) that divides the North Sea into a Scottish sphere and an English sphere. It is estimated that 80-90% of oil revenue is extracted from the parts of the oil fields that fall within the Scottish sphere. Given Scotland’s lack of sovereignty, however, the two-sphere argument was successfully ignored because the logistical and legal complications it brought forth were too much to handle for a state which, at the time, did not even have its own parliament.

Alex Salmond is building his utopian image of an independent Scotland off the platform of North Sea oil. Scotland would, in this dream scenario, vote “yes!” on the referendum and pressure England into accepting its secession. In addition to winning back all the pride and glory its ancestors had been denied, it would now own all the oil and join the exclusive league of Norway, Sweden and Finland, leading a quiet and wealthy existence, not seeking world domination but happily distributing to its 5 million citizens what previously had to be shared with 62 million people.

Is Westminster going to sit idly on the sidelines as more and more Scots get seduced by their first minister’s ingenious and glorious plan? David Cameron is in Edinburgh right now giving speeches urging the Scottish people to vote “no”. His argument is, expectably, that UK citizenship means being part of a world power and brings along the benefits of a world power—a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, NATO, a substantial defense budget, and, among other things, sound fiscal decisions like saying no to the euro. Scottish independence, said Cameron, would make him “deeply, deeply sad.”

Aube Rey Lescure ’15 is in Davenport College.  She is a Globalist Notebook Beat Blogger on E.U. affairs.  Contact her at aube.reylescure@yale.edu.

By Max Watkins

Amidst the turmoil in Egypt, forty three foreigners working at NGOs are being prosecuted for alleged election tampering and are not allowed to leave the country. Of these forty three, nineteen are Americans, including the son of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. Their detainment began in December and is causing serious strains in Egypt’s foreign relations. The United States is now threatening to withhold billions of dollars in aid. Although this situation seems to be an Egyptian foreign policy issue, it reveals much about the internal dynamics and conflicts within a country grappling with post-Mubarak politics and nascent democracy. Egypt can no longer be considered a unitary actor, as this crisis reveals the numerous factions vying for power in a seemingly anarchic system.

Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Lt. Gen. Sami Hafez Enan, chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces, on February 11th at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in Cairo to discuss the fate of the nineteen American citizens currently held within Egypt (D. Myles Cullen / US Department of Defense)

If Egypt were a unitary actor, these foreigners would never have been detained. And even if Egypt had detained them, the threat of losing billions of dollars in American aid would have made them think again. Losing American support would be devastating as Egypt tries to repair its economy. Since the detainees have not been repatriated, we can assume that there are more complicated internal politics at play. Those holding the detainees must not be the recipients of aid money. So we are likely seeing a calculated power play for control of Egypt, with the detainees as pawns.

So if Egypt is not a unitary actor, we must consider the current power brokers.

There are two main factions in Egypt: the military council and the Muslim Brotherhood. Both hold tenuous positions, as each faction is trying to cement its position and power in the new governmental system, at the expense of the other.  Whoever is controlling the status of these foreigners is trying to hurt the other faction and coerce them into some sort of action or behavior. Let us consider the two options.

With the recent elections, the Muslim Brotherhood is expanding and legitimizing its power in the new democracy. The military serves primarily as transitional leaders.  The Muslim Brotherhood has everything to gain and the military has everything to lose. The Muslim Brotherhood is probably attempting to discredit the military and in doing so eliminate its chief rival. Since the military nominally controls – Egypt, angry foreign powers will direct their attention towards the military, blaming them for anything that goes wrong. With mounting international pressure, it is likely the military will lose power and legitimacy, paving the way for the Muslim Brotherhood.

There is a slight chance that it is the military that is detaining the foreigners. Perhaps the military wants to flaunt their power within Egypt. If so, we are seeing a show of force to intimidate the Muslim Brotherhood.  However it is unlikely that the military would risk losing billions of dollars in American aid. There is also the possibility that divisions within either faction are responsible for this incident, but due to the chaotic nature of current Egyptian politics, it is difficult to understand their internal dynamics.

Regardless of who controls the detainees, a very dangerous political game has resulted. Each side is goading the other into increasingly risky moves and in a highly combustible environment like Egypt, the consequences could be dire. The Egyptian people already overthrew an entrenched dictator; they can certainly overthrow bickering factions. Whatever the case may be, the Arab Spring is far from over in Egypt.

Max Watkins ’14 is in Timothy Dwight College. He is a Yale Globalist Beat Blogger on International Conflicts. Contact him at maxwell.watkins@yale.edu.