When Bob Woodward recounts how P resident George W. Bush narrowly won the 2004 election in his trenchant new book State of Denial a feeling of triumph surreally incongruous with the rest of the book overtakes the reader. But then Woodward quickly snaps the reader out of the Bush bubble and back to the real story: disaster in Iraq and the decisions that led to it.

After the first 50 pages, President Bush virtually disappears both from the book and the decision-making. Only now and then does he provide guest appearances as a sort of White House cheerleader—he had been head cheerleader back at Andover— delivering substantively hollow motivational speeches to his cabinet and staff. Woodward depicts President Bush as a hands-off optimist unable or unwilling to fix a dysfunctional war cabinet and as a commander-in-chief ignorant of the perils of low troop levels and the importance of post-war planning. State of Denial, written in the typical “just-the-facts” manner that has propelled Woodward into the top ranks of contemporary American reporters and into the confidence of Washington insiders, follows the officers and officials involved in the war’s decision-making. It tells a grim and progressively frustrating story.

Woodward stokes frustration at the administration’s actions, as he documents how ignored warnings keep ratcheting up without catalyzing a major meeting to reevaluate strategy on Iraq. Woodward shows that the administration ignored information from then-CIA Director George Tenet on the impending 9/11 attacks, from the Central Command and the RAND Corporation on troop levels in Iraq, and from a National Security Council deputy on rebuilding efforts and weak Iraq police training.

Woodward lays much blame at the feet of recently-resigned Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who appears in all his shades of surliness. In early 2003, President Bush even had to persuade Rumsfeld to return Condoleezza Rice’s phone calls. As Rumsfeld preposterously told Rice, “the chain of command does not include the National Security Advisor.”

Woodward also portrays a secretary of defense so keen on revolutionizing U.S. forces that he crushes independent military advice. For example, Woodward hints at the connections between the poor conduct of the war and Rumsfeld’s personnel decisions, which were based less on a candidate’s ability than pliability and passivity. He rejected Admiral Vern Clark, a strong candidate for the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for asserting that he would voice opposition to Rumsfeld whenever he disagreed.

The story of arrogance, excess free rein, and stifling micromanagement repeats in Woodward’s portrayal of post-war reconstruction led by Paul Bremer. According to Woodward, two of Bremer’s most tragic mistakes—de-Baathification and disbanding the army—“hadn’t been touched by the formal interagency process” despite their sharp departure from the original postwar plan.

But for the most part, readers moderately well-versed in the Iraq War will not be surprised by the book’s main points. Woodward’s book is essentially an impressive collection of anecdotes. The style works to illuminate personalities and mindsets while eschewing grand summations on the flaws of the chain of command in the Iraq war. Woodward leaves it to readers and future historians to sift through State of Denial’s 491 pages for broader analysis and to fill in the gaps.

Woodward also limits his scope to the American administration, leaving the troops’ stories and the Iraqi perspective untouched. Equally significant, he is also restricted by the availability of willing sources, a reflection of changing sentiments toward the Iraq situation. In his previous two books on the Bush administration, Woodward employed a more optimistic tone to the reaction to 9/11, the offensive in Afghanistan, and the decision to go to war with Iraq. Perhaps recognizing the difficulty Woodward faced in mustering the same enthusiasm for the Bush administration this time around, President Bush and Vice President Cheney chose not to provide information. After a certain point, Rumsfeld declined interview requests, as well.

State of Denial was released just before this last midterm election, and whatever role it played in voters’ decisions, we can bet that Woodward won’t be invited back to chat at the White House and Pentagon again, at least not by this administration.

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